Authoritarianism, Totalitarianism, or Despotism: What Is Happening in Russia and How Will It End?

Research Fellow at the Aleksanteri Institute of the University of Helsinki, a political scientist, and sociologist.

The term "totalitarianism" has become very popular in connection with the war, although it is not strictly scientific. It is more driven by an emotional urge to label the Russian regime more severely. In reality, the Russian regime is an authoritarian regime of a personalized type. Authoritarian regimes can vary significantly in terms of their level of repression. In other words, one form of authoritarianism is not necessarily better than totalitarianism. Personalized dictatorships are the most common type of authoritarian regimes and are characterized by the absence of institutional constraints on the personal power of the political leader. It should not be confused with monarchy, where there are still some rules, such as rules of succession.

A specialist in political theory and an invited researcher at Princeton University. Until April 2022, he served as the Dean of the Faculty of International Relations and Political Studies at the RANEPA.

Russia is an authoritarian regime that is partly acquiring characteristics resembling a fascist regime and partly moving towards totalitarianism. Some of my colleagues prefer to call it a Caesarist regime. However, these are all subtypes of authoritarian regimes, relatively consolidated, oriented towards the leader, complex in terms of ideology, but still using electoral or voting procedures.

Sociologist

This is Bonapartism in a stage of decay, and at this stage, it has turned into fascism.

"Totalitarian" and "authoritarian" are terms coined in the mid-20th century that relate to a specific historical era. What is happening in Russia now can be described as despotism in its traditional classification and, at the same time, if one has to choose, it is still authoritarianism because there is a monopolization of power and depoliticization of the population. So far, despite the war, there hasn't been a strong re-politicization.

Political Scientist, PhD in Political Science

The political regime in Russia can be described as a personalist autocracy, a type of authoritarian regime.

Historian, PhD in History, Professor, Chief Research Fellow at the St. Petersburg Institute of History of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Professor at the European University at St. Petersburg

The current regime in Russia is complex and cannot be defined by a single term. It operates under laws, but a body of laws has emerged that are inherently unconstitutional, violating key provisions of the Constitution. This creates a unique power structure. It is clear that no immediate changes, such as election cancellations or military rule, are expected and things will proceed as usual. The deviation from the legal framework was achieved in a seemingly legitimate way. Saying that the state is totalitarian–it was that before. Saying that it is autocratic, well yes. But my President, Yeltsin, was also [autocratic], and he was often called "President of all Russia." He laid the foundations of the current regime. His deceptive re-election in 1996 marked a significant departure from the democratic ideals professed at the time.

Sociologist, political commentator

The current system in Russia is a dictatorship. A personalist dictatorship.

Economist, Sociologist, PhD in Economics

I have long argued that this represents a modern form of fascism. It combines nearly all the features of the classic fascist (specifically fascist, not Nazi) regime: personalist power, constant admiration of the historical past, the desire to restore some former achievements, increasing state intervention in various aspects of citizens' lives, direct propaganda of nationalism, and a corporatist state economy. However, it's important to consider the specifics of our time, such as a greater aversion to violence, but I still call this 21st-century fascism.

Senior Research Fellow at the Carnegie Politika Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies

I tend to describe this regime as hybrid totalitarianism. It lacks even the elements of simulated democracy and cannot be solely classified as authoritarian. However, it's not entirely totalitarian either; it retains elements of private life and a market economy, albeit constricted by the state. In authoritarianism, silence suffices to demonstrate compliance, while in totalitarianism, active support is required—voting in agreement, offering one's body for the war machine, writing reports. The level of repression in today's Russia surpasses political persecution in the late USSR. The system operates without rules and lacks the red lines that existed in the declining Soviet Union.

Research Fellow at the Aleksanteri Institute of the University of Helsinki, a political scientist, and sociologist.

The Russian regime has gradually degraded. The starting point is usually considered to be 2007 when Putin appointed his successor, in other words, remained in power, with extensive use of falsifications and restrictions on the activities of political opposition. Of course, there were warning signs earlier: attacks on non-state media. Since then, the political leadership, the narrow circle of Putin's trusted individuals, has remained in power in one form or another. Open political competition has been destroyed.
The next turning point was the mass protests of 2011-12, after which the regime became even more repressive, and, in general, the further slide into hegemonic authoritarianism was more or less predetermined. The annexation of Crimea exacerbated these trends and lent legitimacy to the repression of dissenting groups for some segments of the population.

A specialist in political theory and an invited researcher at Princeton University. Until April 2022, he served as the Dean of the Faculty of International Relations and Political Studies at the RANEPA.

This was a long process that began in the Yeltsin era. When political forces were mobilized for Yeltsin's second term elections in 1996 and then for Putin's elections [in 2000]. During Putin's rule, the regime consistently evolved towards a consolidated authoritarian regime. First, the media came under state control, and second, elections were replaced by electoral procedures. As a result, we simply don't understand who votes and how, and what is happening with the votes more generally. Access to elections is also severely restricted. In the end, elections are only needed to portray approval of the ruling parties and the leader. It's a regime of acclamation.
When such a system operates for more than two decades, various crisis moments arise that push the regime towards even greater concentration of power. We have seen attempts to challenge this regime, primarily associated with the figure of Alexei Navalny and the protests organized by him and his associates. I am primarily referring to the rallies on Bolotnaya Square and Sakharov Avenue. Of course, this is not solely the product of Navalny, but he played a significant role in those events. During that time, the regime realized that it did not fully control the political space and started purging it. Not only the party system is now under control, but also any public movement with the potential for opposition. Ultimately, all of Navalny's offices were shut down, any horizontal solidarity and attempts to build horizontal connections among opposition figures were suppressed.
Another important aspect is the transition of a ruler to the status of sole leader. This situation is similar to the status of Caesar, Mussolini, and partly Erdogan, but mostly Putin. They inevitably become imbued with a messianic spirit. They believe that some mission has descended upon them or they want to leave a significant mark on history, unlike elected leaders in neighboring countries who, in their view, change too frequently and are not memorable. We see that Caesarism and messianism have become the driving forces behind the process that has led us to our current dismal state.

Sociologist

This is a very long question. It would require a twenty-page article to answer.
In the Russian political system, electoral procedures (elections, voting, polls) play a key role. This creates a challenge for contemporary political science when attempting to classify Russia: how can such a strong emphasis on the voice of the people coexist with obvious depoliticization and personalized power? Describing the Russian political regime as transitional or deficient on the democracy scale doesn't fully explain its electoral enthusiasm and stability. To describe the Russian system, the theory of plebiscitary democracy is sometimes used.

In the 1990s, there was a confrontation between quite incompatible elite groups. However, there was no dominant force ready to take power and lead the people. Liberal democrats and conservative communists were in a kind of standoff. Advanced intellectuals and white-collar workers, on the one hand, wanted to live in an enlightened, non-authoritarian country, but they also understood that if they advocated for democracy, they would be under suspicion. They were not interested in that, so they reconciled with Putin's regime. This is called Bonapartism and essentially explains the so-called authoritarian type of regime.
We can talk about an authoritarian regime, in general, even during Yeltsin's time. Gradually, channels of influence from below were closed, independent TV channels were shut down, gubernatorial elections were canceled, and then there was the Putin-Medvedev switch. This gave us the understanding that Putin bypassed term limits and intended to stay in power outside of the rotation. This is a clear sign of an authoritarian regime. Although it should be noted that there are authoritarian regimes that are not personalized but are ruled by a party. Ours is personalized.
After the [Putin-Medvedev] switch, there were demonstrations that were not immediately suppressed, indicating some softness in the regime. But then there were repressions, and Bolotnaya Square became the trigger for the regime to reveal its true nature and tighten control. In simple terms, the ruling circles were afraid of the revolutionary potential, which undoubtedly existed, and they started to tighten the screws.

Political Scientist, PhD in Political Science

Russia's transition to its current state was gradual. In the 1990s, Russia was a democracy with significant flaws, sometimes referred to as a defective democracy. After Vladimir Putin came to power, the country retained this status for some time, with elections still playing a significant role in governance despite emerging authoritarian tendencies. The 2000 elections, which marked Putin's first victory, were generally considered fair. However, Putin's continued hold on power became increasingly associated with restrictions on political freedoms. A critical turning point was from 2003 to 2005, marked by a cleansing of the party system, cancellation of gubernatorial elections, and other steps towards authoritarian transformation. Since then, authoritarian tendencies have strengthened, the role of elections in Russia has consistently diminished, and eventually became zero.
Simultaneously, Putin's personal power grew. Personalist autocracy, a regime of personal power where decisions are made by one leader without institutional constraints, became more pronounced.

Historian, PhD in History, Professor, Chief Research Fellow at the St. Petersburg Institute of History of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Professor at the European University at St. Petersburg

The issue isn't just about Boris Yeltsin's style of governance or his crude desire to ensure the well-being of his "family." More significant is the tectonic shift, a return to Russia's traditional historical path chosen since the time of Ivan Kalita. The past thirty years were an aberration from Russia's historical trajectory, which has been dominated by some form of dictatorship and imperialism. This historical pattern, rooted in the influence of the Tatar-Mongol yoke, emphasized territorial expansion and strong centralized power. This differed sharply from the self-governance and city democracy found in places like Veliky Novgorod. In Moscow, these institutions never existed . The expansion of power into new territories mirrored the autocratic model established in Moscow marked by an iron-fisted rule, capricious in nature. As Pushkin wrote, in Russia, a person's life depended on the “whims of autocracy.”
The current ruler of Russia has inherited many traits characteristic of historical Russia. This discourse, however, is not exclusive to him but is also prevalent in society, which, until the late 1990s, lived under a similar regime. The perception of unchanging power has always been largely normalized. Autocratic rule made it a crime to speculate about the ruler's age and potential abdication. The serfdom system profoundly affected the innate human sense of freedom. The image of defrauded investors kneeling with protest signs exemplifies a deep-rooted tradition. How a servant pleads to the tsar to collect his earned wages — "Mercy, Sovereign, show pity, grant me, your humble servant, your alms" — highlights a mindset where everything belongs to the ruler, and it's at their discretion to grant or withhold what's duly earned.
Regarding the concept of empire, it involves not only the ruler's will but also the people's perception of space. The idea of a vast, ever-expanding territory is deeply ingrained in the Russian consciousness, often seen as more important than anything else. “We love space (remember the words of the patriotic song “Vast is my Motherland”), we are big, we never have enough land.” This peculiar, distorted desire for freedom and expansiveness is a key characteristic of the people. The power structure has well understood this notion of grandeur as a core value, hence from ancient times, every ruler was expected to annex new territories. A ruler who failed to do so was considered ineffective by the people. This ambition for territorial expansion remains significant even today.
The approval of the government's actions in annexing territories partially soothes the longing for the Soviet Union. This sentiment is not based on the notion that Russians should dominate, but rather on the desire for a vast, unified, indivisible, and homogenous country. So that you can spread your hands and exclaim: “I don’t know another country like this, where people can breathe so freely.” And these thoughts were expressed during an era of extreme dictatorship.

Sociologist, political commentator

Russia's current political structure evolved from the degradation of the previous regime–bureaucratic authoritarianism–and was solidified by the constitutional coup of 2020. At first, the state bureaucracy, serving as the vanguard of authoritarian modernization, became tolerant of repression and violence. This tolerance eventually extended to the population, which benefited this bureaucracy. In January 2020, the system of checks and balances within the government apparatus that protected the autonomy of the civilian bureaucracy was dismantled. The security apparatus seized control of the state machinery, “selling” the dictator an agenda of war and tightening of control, born from the notion of existential external threat. This agenda was transformed by the dictator into an actual war.

Economist, Sociologist, PhD in Economics

Russia's journey to its current state has been a lengthy process. In my opinion, the "boundary between good and evil" lies between Gorbachev and Yeltsin. This is because if we examine the principles of democracy, we can see that they had already essentially ended with the arrival of Boris Nikolayevich [Yeltsin].
What is democracy? Democracy is a system where the ruling party can be legitimately changed through non-violent means. In the USSR, the Communist Party ruled, but under societal pressure, it relinquished power, leading to the election of people's representatives, who eventually became the new authority. Boris Yeltsin was elected President of the RSFSR in 1991, still during the Soviet era. However, in the new Russia, the incumbents never conceded to opponents, from the 1993 Supreme Soviet attack to the recent manipulated elections. The 'democrats' immediately demonstrated that power was their absolute priority.
The Gorbachev era was a time of greater liberalism and democracy. From 1992 onwards, the current system began to take shape. Key developments included the revision of federal relations, the 1993 Constitution tailored for a presidential-dictatorial system, the promotion of religiosity, the rigged 1996 elections, and Yeltsin's appointment of a successor instead of holding elections. These were signs of a new era. Before Putin, Moscow supported separatism in Abkhazia and Transnistria but suppressed it in Chechnya, setting a precedent for double standards. This period marked the beginning of deception, corruption, and tightening control, eventually leading to dictatorship. The regime then appeared softer only due to fewer resources and less financial strength. Yeltsin, despite seeking Western support, harbored similar authoritarian inclinations.

Senior Research Fellow at the Carnegie Politika Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies

How did Russia get here? Russia's journey to its current situation involved a gradual narrowing of the space for freedom. Society adapted to each new level of this decline as if it were a "new normal," compromising and profiting from the system. The Russian elites failed by accepting an authoritarianism they believed to be rational and soft due to its corrupt nature. However, it turned out that Putin's team prioritized a messianic national-imperialist, anti-modernization, fundamentalist, archaic ideology, grotesquely surviving over the centuries. This ideology was then put into practice with the acquiescence and agreement of the majority of the population and the elites, who did not value the rotation of power and failed to realize that beyond bourgeois market consumption, human and civil rights exist, as well as the civic duty to care for the country's future using democracy as a practical tool.

Research Fellow at the Aleksanteri Institute of the University of Helsinki, a political scientist, and sociologist.

Liberalization is theoretically possible; however, it would still require economic and political groups that support a movement towards political relaxation. It also requires some coordination between the moderate opposition and the moderate supporters of the regime. Currently, such a prospect seems unlikely. The Russian situation is further exacerbated by the fact that radically inclined militarized groups have gained the right to vote and even political representation (referring to "Wagnerites"). New technologies also contribute to the detrimental impact of state propaganda. In the distant future, I see two scenarios: 1) South Korea, where the transition occurred practically without the so-called "elite split" and with very active involvement of the international community and Western investments. 2) Serbia, where distrust towards the US and NATO has persisted for many years, and the sense of resentment has dulled but not disappeared. However, Serbia, despite numerous problems, remains an electoral democracy with political competition. This would probably be an optimistic development scenario for Russia.

A specialist in political theory and an invited researcher at Princeton University. Until April 2022, he served as the Dean of the Faculty of International Relations and Political Studies at the RANEPA.

I'm afraid that, overall, there is no chance to change this situation. It has gotten to the point that it is essentially irreparable. Too much blood has been spilled. In this regard, Russia has antagonized the entire Ukrainian population for decades to come. Lives that have been lost can never be brought back. Looking forward, there are different scenarios for the development of this situation. I'm afraid this will not be a conversation about course correction but rather a discussion of possible scenarios with regimes like what Russia has currently. We have examples of both the survival and collapse of such regimes. I think the main factor in the development of the Russian political regime will be the outcome of the current war.
The current Russian regime is trying to make what’s happening into a permanent state of affairs. Of course, it would be in Russia's interest to put an end to the war and call on the world to recognize its territorial acquisitions. However, this will not happen under any circumstances. Therefore, the war will continue, and the main turning point will be whether the regime wins or loses. It is clear that both victory and defeat are constructs, and within the country, the regime will try to present both outcomes in a way that benefits it. But there are examples of defeats for such regimes. I'm not even talking about Nazi Germany today. You could talk about Italian fascism or, more relevant in our timeline, the Argentine regime, which also started an unsuccessful military campaign with the Falkland Islands and lost, leading to the collapse of the regime and changes in the country. I do not exclude that, in the event of a defeat in the war with Ukraine, similar changes may occur in Russia.
In that case, where they will turn is hard to predict. It could be a turn towards democratization, or it could be a turn towards some new form of military dictatorship. It will all depend on whose power prevails after the military defeat. If the regime in one form or another achieves victory, or reaches a point that can be presented as a victory, there is a high probability of its further consolidation. There are no exact historical analogies for such victories, but for example, you could recall the Vietnam War. When North Vietnam eventually won, the United States withdrew from South Vietnam, and the entire country united under an authoritarian socialist regime, which consolidated itself and continued to exist. Such a possibility in the Russian case is also possible.

Sociologist

Yes, the situation in Russia can be corrected. The cases of France in 1870 and Germany in 1945 demonstrate that such regimes end with military defeat, severe internal crises, and a shift towards a republic. There are no iron laws in history.

Correcting the situation is certainly possible because we currently have a personalized regime. Immortality hasn't been invented yet, so it cannot last forever. If it were structured like in the Soviet Union, where there was a party with channels for renewal and collective leadership, then yes, it could continue even after Putin's death. But right now, nothing like that exists; it's classic despotism, or perhaps even tyranny.
I don't think the end of the war will be a major factor in the regime's transformation. The glass is always half empty: the war will be partially lost in some aspects and partially won in others. Given that the propaganda component remains strong, unfortunately, I don't think the war in Russia can be considered "lost." And if they do lose, they will say it was organized by a fifth column. This will be used as an explanation for further tightening of the regime.
Yes, there will be difficulties with such an outcome, and Russia will appear much less powerful than before. But beyond that, it all depends on the personality [of Putin] and his fate because he is the functional center and has quite a few supporters and like-minded individuals.

Political Scientist, PhD in Political Science

No political regime is everlasting, especially personalist autocracies, because they are inherently tied to a single individual, and all humans are mortal.
Discussing the prospects for political changes in Russia before Vladimir Putin leaves office for “natural reasons” is more complex. There are instances where personalist autocracies have ended due to military coups, palace conspiracies, or mass protests. Currently, there are no immediate prospects for any of these scenarios in Russia. However, this does not mean they are impossible, as they can arise unexpectedly. This is particularly true for coups and conspiracies, which, if known about beforehand, likely means they do not actually exist. Successful conspiracies are always planned in secrecy.
It is premature to discuss the outcome of the war because it is not predetermined. However, if the outcome is interpreted as a defeat for Russia, which is not apparent at the moment, it would naturally weaken Putin's ability to maintain power and might encourage players within the current system to oppose him.
Personalist autocracy is the most common form of authoritarianism in the modern world, exemplified by some African and Arab countries, and to a lesser extent, Asian nations. However, there are no direct analogs to Russia, as it is a very large country equipped with nuclear weapons and plays a significant role on the international stage.
When discussing the actions of personalist autocracies, rather than their outcomes, it is noted that the world pays significant attention to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. However, concurrently, there is Rwanda's invasion of the neighboring Democratic Republic of Congo, which mirrors the situation between Russia and Ukraine in many respects. Yet, Rwanda and Congo attract far less global interest because Rwanda is not as significant a country as Russia.

Historian, PhD in History, Professor, Chief Research Fellow at the St. Petersburg Institute of History of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Professor at the European University at St. Petersburg

As a historian, I see no democratic prospects. It appears that people do not crave freedom, as if the public consciousness is unprepared for democratic evolution. There's even a feeling that for many, especially after the regime's tightening, everything is finally becoming more familiar and clear. Thus, my view on Russia's future is pessimistic. However, for very many, I believe for the majority, it's quite the opposite. They are optimistic, seeing it as the end of turmoil and contradictions, of the arduous necessity to make choices, to think, struggle, and take risks. At last, we are entering a harbor of Peace.
Regarding historical analogies, I doubt that the experiences of other countries can be applied to Russia. It seems to possess a unique destiny. In the 18th century, Field Marshal Minich, observing the twists of power and the chaos, wrote: "Undoubtedly, Russia is under God's protection; otherwise, it is impossible to understand how it can exist."

Sociologist, political commentator

No, there are neither chances nor analogies.

Economist, Sociologist, PhD in Economics

In the next three to five years, I don't foresee any possibilities for change in Russia, and there are no historical parallels. A comparison could be made to Germany in the 1920s, which was then considered a "normal country" but eventually gave rise to Hitler. However, Germany's correction became possible only after its defeat in the war and forced denazification, and its integration into NATO and the European Union. No one is planning to occupy and reform Russia, so changes in the country can only be expected after the death of V. Putin. Authoritarian dictatorial regimes usually disappear with their creator. Thus, we currently have no reason to hope for change, and it is challenging to predict what they might look like "after Putin."

Senior Research Fellow at the Carnegie Politika Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies

Currently, despite a high degree of resistance in civil society, as evidenced by OVD-Info statistics, there is no chance for change from below. The level of repression is so high that grassroots signals are stifled, not to mention the indifference of passive conformists who themselves block any expressions of dissatisfaction from below.
Historically, significant changes in Russia, especially during the Soviet and post-Soviet periods, have started from the top. Recall the periods following Stalin's death and the succession of gerontocrats. When figures symbolizing ineffective regimes passed away or were removed, liberalization began, as seen during Khrushchev's Thaw and Gorbachev's Perestroika, which evolved into Yeltsin's short reformist period. Therefore, change is possible, but predicting its nature and timing is not.
Russia does not have its own Juan Carlos, and Putin's regime is harsher than the late Francoist system in Spain. There is also no certainty that a transition period in Russia would involve the same responsible behavior by the elites as in post-Franco Spain. Nonetheless, this is another example of a top-down transformation of the system.